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Abstract
We develop a system dynamics model of message-based communication, where the information-
processing capacity of message recipients is limited. Profit-seeking broadcasters send messages,
but only some of these messages are valuable to recipients. Recipients cannot determine whether
or not a message is valuable until it is processed. Information overload occurs when more mes-
sages arrive than recipients can process. Numerical experiments test alternative approaches for
mitigating information overload. We show that message filtering can increase the flow of for-profit
communication. Market-based mechanisms, while aimed at improving the social outcome, can
actually lead to suboptimal results and to a complete collapse of for-profit communication.
Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Syst. Dyn. Rev. 24, 377–405, (2008)
Introduction
Electronic mail has become an important component of the digital marketing
portfolio for many organizations (Gatti, 2004a). A motivation for the wide
adoption of direct online marketing is the superior return on investment, as
compared to any other type of marketing. According to the Direct Marketing
Association, the return on investment for commercial e-mail is about $50 for every
dollar spent, while catalog sales are only about $7 for every dollar spent (Magill,
2007). The exceptional return is possible due to the high degree of customization
(Rust and Espinoza, 2006) and very low cost of e-mail communication.
From a social standpoint, a major drawback of commercial e-mail, also
called spam, is that it imposes both direct and indirect costs on the receiving
side. The direct cost entails the infrastructure needed to support a high flow of
commercial e-mail and filters that sort through the incoming messages. The
indirect cost results from the attention that the recipients must dedicate to
processing commercial messages. Inbox clutter due to spam has led to a strong
sentiment in society against commercial e-mail. Some even go so far as to say
that “spam has ruined the Internet” (Fallows, 2003).
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Despite the efforts of regulators, Internet service providers (ISPs) and the
vendors of anti-spam products, global spam production has been increasing.
There are many players in the spam industry—including software companies,
e-mail harvesters, spammers, sellers and ISPs (Scalet, 2003; McWilliams, 2005;
Claburn, 2008)—who have vested interests in continuance of e-mail spam. In
2007, marketers spent about $500 million on e-mail advertising and generated
about $23 billion in sales (Magill, 2007). There is also a thriving spam-fighting
industry: a $140 billion a year business (Kleiner, 2008).
The problem of unwanted commercial messages is significant on other
communication platforms (Marshal, 2007), such as instant messaging (spim),
blogs, forums and mobile text messaging. Spammers are known to use
bogus accounts on social websites, such as Facebook and MySpace (Kleiner,
2008). Even cellular telephones are affected by unsolicited commercial
messages, exemplified by Verizon’s filing of a lawsuit in 2006 against a spam
company.
In this paper, we model the mechanism common to spam, spim and any
other type of commercial communication that depends on the limited informa-
tion-processing capacity of recipients. A generic model of communication is
used to test proposed remedies for decreasing the flow of marketing messages.
We show that reliance on filtering will not, by itself, solve the spam problem.
Market-oriented solutions offer a much better alternative, but may lead to
market failure. The findings add to the current public policy debate about the
direct online marketing industry. E-mail, the inspiration for this paper, is a
common good (Regan, 2002; Pavlov et al., 2005), which makes the analysis of
this paper also relevant to the ongoing discussions about digital commons
(Stix, 2002; Hunter, 2003; Greco and Floridi, 2004) and their management
(McFadden, 2001).
The next section gives some facts about direct marketing, including spam.
The section also reviews mitigation methods. The discussion suggests several
reference modes. In the following two sections, we outline our dynamic
hypothesis and present a system dynamics model. In the Policies section, we
investigate the effects of the proposed mitigation mechanisms. We conclude
with a discussion of our research results.
Reference modes
Possible scenarios
Spam industry observers agree that spam production has been growing over
the years (The Economist, 2004; Kleiner, 2008). It was under 10 percent of
the global e-mail traffic in 2000, but now spam constitutes over 90 percent of
global e-mail traffic. Therefore, the feared scenario is that overall spam produc-
tion may increase (Figure 1).
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Fig. 1. Reference mode
for possible scenarios
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While a reduction in spam production might be desirable, an all-out elimi-
nation of spam (if it were possible) would not be socially optimal (e.g., Sweet,
2003; Dai and Li, 2004; Goldman, 2006). First, to maximize social welfare,
some spam should be allowed (Loder et al., 2006). Second, spam also provides
an inexpensive communication tool for political and grass-roots organizations
(Sweet, 2003). A desired scenario would be a reduction in spam production,
but not its complete elimination (Figure 1).
Response rate
Traditional marketers are aware of the negative relationship between the
advertising volume sent to a group of recipients and the response rate (Rudolph,
1947; Starch, 1966; Houston and Scott, 1984). Recent research suggests that
the same negative relationship holds for electronic markets. For instance,
Martin et al. (2003) found that in the case of a permission-based e-mail cam-
paign, the likelihood of visiting a link advertised within an e-mail decreased
as volume of e-mail from the company increased. Similarly, a survey by the
Pew Internet & American Life Project (Rainie and Fallows, 2004) found a
decline in the readership of marketing e-mails as their volume increased.
Anecdotal evidence from spammers (Hansell, 2003) also confirms the exist-
ence of a negative relationship between the amount of spam a group receives
and its response rate. A system dynamics model that simulates marketing
response should reproduce the negative pattern (Figure 2(a)).
Filtering
The most widely deployed tool for controlling unwanted spam is filtering. A
survey found that 62 percent of online users rely on spam filters (Gatti, 2004c).
The function of a spam filter is to identify and divert spam before it reaches
the addressee’s inbox. Filtering can be very effective at blocking all kinds of
commercial messages, as acknowledged by spammers themselves (McWilliams,
2005, p. 89). The benefit of filtering is that it reduces demand for the attention
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Fig. 2. Reference modes: (a) response rate and ad exposure; (b) effect of an improved filter on spam delivery; (c) effect of an
improved filter on message blocking; (d) claimed effect of attention bond on response rate
of the e-mail user. The filtering solution seems to be working, to the extent that
users report a lesser burden of spam at work than on their personal e-mail
accounts because of active e-mail screening at work (Fallows, 2003). This fact
suggests that a flow of commercial messages to individual inboxes depends on
the filtering effort (Figure 2(b)).
A downside of the technology is that filters are costly (in terms of time and
money). Plus, the cost falls on the recipients, rather than the senders, of spam.
Another drawback is that filters are imperfect: the software can mistakenly
identify legitimate e-mail as spam (false positive) and let spam get through to
the inbox (false negative). For example, in one study, the SpamCatcher soft-
ware classified 1.1 percent of legitimate e-mail as spam, i.e. false positives,
and allowed 12 percent of spam into inboxes, i.e. false-negatives (Rubenking,
2004). Marketers report that between 10 and 17 percent of permission-based
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commercial e-mail is blocked (Gatti, 2004a, 2004b). A survey found that among
those who use filters, only 17 percent think filters work very well, 25 percent
reported that filters block wanted messages, and 48 percent reported that filters
let through excessively many unwanted messages (Gatti, 2004c). An improved
filter should be able to block more unwanted marketing messages (Figure 2(c)).
Market mechanisms
Because of the many problems with filtering, there is an active interest in
exploring market-based solution. Market-based solutions aim to mitigate the
misallocation of the full cost associated with spam by aligning the private cost
more closely with the social cost. There are two major proposals: the electronic
postage surcharge and an attention bond mechanism.
The electronic postage scheme (Kraut et al., 2002; Van Zandt, 2004; Loder
et al., 2006) envisions charging commercial marketers a fixed surcharge for
each message they sent. Microsoft’s Bill Gates has been known to support
e-mail postage (The Economist, 2004). One of the first working implementa-
tions of such a surcharge system is offered by a company named Goodmail
(http://www.goodmailsystems.com/; last accessed 23 May 2008). In the
Goodmail system, a client company purchases electronic security “strips” in
bulk from Goodmail. Proprietary software attaches the “strips” to the outgoing
e-mails of the client. Goodmail has enlisted several ISPs that do not block an
e-mail if the e-mail contains the security “strip” attached to the heading of
the message. Companies such as Petco and Godiva Chocolatier are among
Goodmail’s customers.
Fahlman (2002) advanced a concept of interrupt rights for e-mail or phone
calls, which Loder et al. (2006) call an attention bond mechanism. Its eco-
nomic logic is to offer monetary compensation to the person who bears the cost
of an interruption from an incoming communication (The Economist, 2004).
The schema resembles the direct marketing practice of inducing customer
response by offering a financial incentive with a marketing message (Turley,
1999; Chittenden and Rettie, 2003; EmailLabs, 2006). One of the earliest atten-
tion bond mechanisms was implemented and offered by Return Path, under the
name Bonded Sender Program. Return Path claimed that, on average, response
rates for marketers who participated in the program improved significantly
(Return Path, 2006). Figure 2(d) shows the expected improvement in response
rates under the attention bond scheme as a reference mode.
Dynamic hypothesis
The commercial e-mail industry is driven by the promise of profit (Scalet, 2003;
McWilliams, 2005; Claburn, 2008). Profit, also called surplus, determines the
stock of communication funding available for marketing campaigns (Figure 3).
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Fig. 3. A dynamic hypothesis
More money for communication increases the flow of marketing messages. The
higher the price of sending a marketing message, the lower the marketing
messages flow is. The flows of regular and marketing messages drive the
message addition rate to the message backlog.
The messages in the backlog can be either processed or deleted. The message
processing rate depends on the backlog and the time available for processing.
Processing messages relieves the backlog, and hence a negative link between
the message processing rate and the stock message backlog. But as the message
backlog grows, so does the information overload the recipients experience. As
the recipients feel overburdened with messages, they delete an increasing number
of messages before opening them. Deleting messages reduces the message backlog.
As messages from the backlog are processed, the recipients might find some
of the commercial messages valuable. Recipients respond to valuable market-
ing messages, thus generating revenue for spammers. The greater the fraction
of valuable marketing messages in the message backlog, the more valuable
marketing messages are processed and more revenue is generated. The positive
Oleg V. Pavlov et al.: Communication Model 383
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/sdr
relationship between revenue, message processing rate and fraction of valu-
able marketing messages is shown as positive links in Figure 3.
The causal links form three loops: the reinforcing Spam Growth loop, the
balancing Message Processing loop and the balancing Message Deletion loop.
The Spam Growth loop drives spam production, checked by the balancing loops.
A minor balancing loop, Message Processing, controls the message backlog,
while recipients have not exhausted their time available. When recipients see
that the message backlog is greater than they can process, the Message Process-
ing loop can no longer stop message backlog growth. At that point, the balanc-
ing Message Deletion loop must slow down the growth of the backlog.
An examination of the diagram in Figure 3 reveals that the causal structure is
an extension of a well-known limits-to-growth generic structure (Senge, 1990).
The limits-to-growth structure characteristically has at least one reinforcing
loop and at least one balancing loop dependent on some limiting constraint. In
our case, attention—modeled as time available—is the limiting constraint. As
is typical of limits-to-growth structures, we expect the structure in Figure 3 to
generate S-shaped trajectories for our stock variables.
The filtering effort has two effects (Figure 3): it blocks some messages, and
therefore reduces the message addition rate. By blocking unwanted messages,
the filter also improves the fraction of valuable marketing messages in the
backlog. If an electronic postage surcharge is introduced, it will directly add to
the price of sending a marketing message—just as higher regular postage adds
to the price of mailing a letter. When recipients withdraw attention bonds, the
surplus of spammers is reduced.
Model
The spam industry is populated by highly specialized economic agents, each
performing a distinct role (Scalet, 2003; McWilliams, 2005; Claburn, 2008).
This model, however, simplifies reality by considering only five types of players,
all conveniently aggregated and organized into model sectors (Figure 4). The
sectors are: Recipients, Sponsors, Broadcasters A, Broadcasters B and the
Information Technology (IT) Company.
Because the topic of this paper is relevant to many information systems (IS)
platforms (e-mail, text messaging, blogs, etc.), we model communication in
generic terms. We refer to messages as type-A and type-B. Type-A messages are
regular messages, valued by their Recipients. Type-B messages are marketing
messages; only a fraction of them is valuable to Recipients. Within the e-mail
context, type-A messages are regular e-mail messages and type-B messages are
spam. The messages are produced correspondingly by Broadcasters A and
Broadcasters B. When Recipients respond to marketing messages, Sponsors
receive revenue. Sponsors then pay Broadcasters B to send more type-B
messages. The IT Company provides Recipients with a filter.
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Fig. 4. Subsystem diagram
This paper is concerned with the global trend in marketing communication.
Therefore, rather than modeling individual inboxes, we aggregate them as a
message backlog in the Recipients sector. We can think of the Recipients sector
as a representation of, for example, either a national market or an ISP with
many customers. A defining feature of such a group of customers is that their
collective attention, regardless of how large the group is, is a scarce economic
resource (Davenport and Beck, 2001).
One can think of several ways to implement marketing mitigation mecha-
nisms. We assume that the burden of surcharges, if introduced, falls directly
on Broadcasters B (the spammers) and, if the bond mechanism is instituted,
then Sponsors have to provide the bond payments.
Unlike previous research on the spam problem (e.g., Van Zandt, 2004; Khong,
2004; Anderson and De Palma, 2005; Loder et al., 2006), we construct a system
dynamics model. The model has been implemented in Vensim DSS. We set the
time horizon as one year (365 days). In the following sections we describe the
model sector by sector.
Recipients
Within the Recipients sector, two types of messages—type-A messages (A
messages, for short) and type-B messages (B messages)—are added to the
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aggregate message backlog (Figure 5). As a group, Recipients can either process
messages from the backlog or delete them. This subsection describes in detail
the system dynamics formulation of the Recipients sector.
Message backlog
We do not differentiate between individual recipients but, rather, we consider
an aggregate backlog M, comprised of messages in the inboxes of all recipients.
Fig. 5. Recipients
receive two types of
messages. Messages
from the message
backlog can be either
processed or deleted
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Each period, a flow of messages mi is added to the backlog, a mix of A and B
messages. The backlog can be reduced either because messages are processed
or because they are deleted. The two corresponding rates are mo and md. The
message backlog is described by the equation
(d/dt)M = mi − mo − md (1)
Figure 6 shows the stock and flow representation of Eq. 1. Below we explain
these three rates.
We denote the flow of type-A messages as a. The flow of type-B messages is
b. We assume that all A messages are valuable to the recipients. However,
recipients only value a fraction ρ of B messages. Hence, the flow of valuable B
messages is bv = ρb. Then, among all messages, the flow of valuable messages is
mv = a + bv. Since we assume that all A messages are valuable, the flow of non-
valuable messages that arrive to the organization consists only of the flow of
non-valuable B messages, that is, mn = b − bv.
Incoming messages are analyzed by a filter. For simplicity, we assume that
messages identified by the filter as non-valuable are discarded. Ideally, all A
messages should be properly identified and delivered to the inboxes and only
valuable B messages should be delivered. However, the filter may discard
mistakenly some valuable messages (false positive) and may let some non-
valuable messages through (false negative). We denote the percent of false
positives as η1 and percent of false negatives as η2. An ideal filter makes no
errors, that is, η1 = η2 = 0. No filtering implies misspecification rates of η1 = 0
and η2 = 1. The worst filter has misspecification rates of η1 = η2 = 1.
The filter recognizes mv
f = (1 − η1)mv of valuable messages as valuable, and
mn
f = η2mn (2)
of non-valuable messages are also identified as valuable (i.e., false negatives).
The message addition rate is the flow of messages that pass through the filter
and are added to the backlog, mi = mvf + mnf.
Since demand for attention and demand for time are two closely related
concepts, we represent attention in units of time. Note that it is possible, if
desired, to be more specific in representing attention (Pashler, 1998), but
thinking of attention as time will suffice for this analysis. We assume that
recipients spend some limited combined budget of time T = RTR on processing
messages, where R is the number of recipients and TR is the average time that a
recipient spends processing messages each day. The message processing rate,
mo, depends on the time available T and the average time it takes to process a
message, τ. The rate mo does not exceed the typical volume processed every
day, M/γ, where γ is the normal response delay. We assume γ is constant. Then,
the message processing rate is
mo = min(T/τ, M/γ) (3)
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Note that this formulation depends on two assumptions. First, it assumes
perfect intertemporal mixing; that is, no FIFO rule is followed in answering
messages. Second, it assumes that a recipient has no way of determining
whether or not a particular message is valuable until he or she processes it.
To process M/γ messages, recipients require time T*, proportional to the
average time it takes to process a typical message τ :
T* = (M /γ)τ (4)
We define average overload among the recipient population as the ratio of the
time required to complete a task to the actual time available for the task:
λ = T*/T. Here the task is to process M /γ messages. When sufficient time
is available to process messages, there is no overload and λ falls in the
range between zero and one. A value λ > 1 implies that recipients experience
overload.
A survey found that, once there is an excessive amount of e-mail, people
tend to delete e-mail without reading it (EmailLabs, 2006). We capture this
finding by specifying that as the average overload λ increases, so does the
number of messages that are deleted without being processed. We assume that
the average message deletion rate md is a smooth S-shaped function of the
average overload λ. We describe the message deletion rate as
md = eod · d M/γ (5)
The effect of overload on deletion, eod, is an S-shaped curve (Figure 7). The
parameter d determines the magnitude of the deletion rate. The ratio M/γ acts
as a first-order control.
Backlog attributes
The model tracks message backlog attributes required for the analysis of the
attention bond mechanism. The attributes of interest are the average fraction of
Fig. 7. Graphical table
function for eod
Oleg V. Pavlov et al.: Communication Model 389
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/sdr
Fig. 8. The average fraction of B messages in the backlog model section
B messages and the average fraction of valuable B messages in the backlog. To
compute the attributes, we use the coflow formulation described below.
Figure 8 shows the model section that calculates the average fraction of B






b bi o    = − (6)
The B message addition rate bi is equal to the number of type-B messages
added to the backlog M. The B message exit rate bo describes the removal of B
messages from the backlog M, either through processing or deletion. The aver-
age fraction of B messages in the backlog is
  
θ   = B
M
(7)
The rate bi is equal to bi = bvf + mnf, where
bv
f = (1 − η1)bv (8)
is the flow of valuable B messages that pass the filter and are added to the
backlog, and mn
f is the flow of non-valuable B messages that pass through the
filter (Eq. 2). The B message exit rate is defined as
bo = bp + bd (9)
This rate is equal to the sum of B messages processed, bp = moq, and B messages
deleted, bd = mdq, from the message backlog M.
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Fig. 9. The average fraction of valuable B messages in the backlog model section
Figure 9 shows the model section that computes the average fraction of
valuable B messages in the backlog. The number of valuable type-B messages











B    = − (10)
Here, vi
B is the valuable B messages addition rate that accounts only for valu-
able type-B messages added to backlog M. The valuable B messages exit rate vo
B
equals the number of valuable type-B messages that are either processed or
deleted each day, and r is the average fraction of valuable type-B messages in
the backlog:






We also define the rates vi
B = bvf (Eq. 8) and voB = bpv + bdv. Here,
bp
v = mor (12)
are the valuable B messages processed per day, and bd
v = mdr are the valuable B
messages deleted per day.
Sponsors
Sponsors financially support communication of broadcasters B. In Figure 10,
communication funding, S, is equal to the difference between the new budget
Oleg V. Pavlov et al.: Communication Model 391
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Fig. 10. The Sponsors
model sector
allocations i and the expenditure on broadcasting, e, which is paid to broad-
casters B:
(d/dt)S = i − e (13)
Once allocated, the budget is spent over a budget duration τS:
e = S/τS (14)
Assuming that sponsors have no fixed cost, they earn a surplus π = RS − CS,
where RS is the sponsors’ revenue and CS is the sponsors’ cost. We model the
expected per-message sponsor revenue by assuming that each time recipients
process a valuable type-B message sponsors receive a marginal revenue r.
Assuming a constant marginal revenue, sponsors receive revenue RS = rbpv,
where bp
v are the responses that sponsors receive per day, equal to the valuable
B messages processed per day.
Although companies use a variety of approaches to budget for commercial e-
mail (EmailLabs, 2006, p. 26), we assume for simplicity that sponsors allocate
a fraction ξ of surplus to broadcasting. Considering that allocations must be
non-negative, the budget allocation rate is
i = max(ξπ, 0) (15)
392 System Dynamics Review Volume 24 Number 3 Fall 2008








If an attention bond system is applied, then the sponsor must pay some fixed
amount to recipients each time a non-valuable message is processed. To accommo-
date these payments, sponsor cost includes the value of warrants withdrawn,
which is a product of the value of a bond, ω, and the number of bonds cashed.
The bonds cashed is the difference between type-B messages processed, bp, and
valuable type-B messages processed, bp
v. Hence, the withdrawn bonds value is
ω (bp −bpv). The resulting cost is the sum of the expenditure on commercial e-mail
and the withdrawn bonds value:
CS = e + ω (bp − bpv) (16)
Setting ω = 0 is equivalent to a regime without a bond system.
Broadcasters
There are two types of broadcasters: A and B. Broadcasters A (Figure 11) send a
flow a of type-A messages on their own behalf. We set a = aRR, where aR is the
average flow of A messages per recipient per day and R is the number of
recipients.
Figure 12 shows the Broadcasters B model sector. Broadcasters B send type-
B messages, but only if sponsors pay. The flow of B messages is determined by
the sponsor expenditure rate, e, and is inversely proportional to the base price
of sending a B message pb:
b = e/pb (17)
Oleg V. Pavlov et al.: Communication Model 393





curve and its shifts.
Parameter η1 denotes
the percent of false





pb = pb + s (18)
where pb is the base price per B message and s is a surcharge for each type-B
message. Note that the surcharges do not apply to Broadcasters A.
Broadcasters B also set the share of valuable B messages, ρ, in the flow of B
messages. Broadcasters can improve ρ through better targeting and customization,
for example, but ρ is fixed in this model.
IT Company
The IT Company provides a communication filter. Its purpose is to block non-
valuable messages.
With all filters, there is a tradeoff between false-positive and false-negative
percentages (Cormack, 2006). It is possible to achieve zero false positives,
but this would imply higher false negatives. For example, no filtering at all
produces zero false positives at the expense of 100 percent false negatives.
This tradeoff can be graphically shown as a Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve (Figure 13). Better filters correspond to higher curves. Point (0,0)
corresponds to an ideal filter. The worst filter situation is described by point
(1,1), which is actually worse than having no filter. The point equivalent to the
absence of a filter is (0,1). A convenient summary measure of a filter’s perform-
ance is 1 − ROCA, where ROCA is the area under the ROC curve (Cormack,
2006). The 1 − ROCA is a number between 0 and 1, which measures the overall
394 System Dynamics Review Volume 24 Number 3 Fall 2008
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Fig. 14. The IT
Company model sector
misspecification percentage. The ideal filter corresponds to 1 − ROCA = 0, and
the worst filter means 1 − ROCA = 1.
Figure 14 shows the stock and flow diagram of the IT Company. For nota-
tional convenience, we will refer to 1 − ROCA as Φ (Figure 13). Filter improve-
ment φo decreases the misspecification rate Φ:
(d/dt)Φ = −φo (19)
Filter improvements are driven by the gap between the desirable aggregate
misspecification rate Φ* and the current state of the filter Φ:
φo = (Φ − Φ*)/λφ (20)
where λφ is the filter improvement delay. Recipients have some desired Φ*
based on the balance of effort to process e-mail versus the cost of a better
filtering tool. We set Φ* exogenously.
Suppose the ROC line in Figure 13 is above the 45-degree line, so that
0 ≤ Φ < 0.5. As the filtering technology improves, Φ changes by a certain ratio
α = Φ/F, where F is the original aggregate misspecification rate. Even though a
simplification, we also assume that the tradeoff between false positives and
false negatives is constant over time. This implies that the slope of the ROC
curve remains constant, which allows using properties of similar triangles
to find η1 and η2 as the ROC curve shifts. Rates η1 and η2 change by the factor
α  from their original values h1 and h2:












Oleg V. Pavlov et al.: Communication Model 395
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/sdr
Test
1 Increasing the number of recipients R also increases e-mail backlog, but it should not
change the average overload in the steady state
2 In the presence of filtering, r should be greater than ρ
3 In the situation equivalent to the absence of filtering, i.e., η1 = 0 and η2 = 1, steady-state
values of the average fraction of valuable type-B messages in the backlog, r, should
be equal to the share of valuable messages among type-B messages, ρ
4 Steady-state values must satisfy these logical conditions: VB < M and VB ≤ B
5 If Φ drops by α percent, then η1 and η2 drop by α  percent
6 Increasing the marginal revenue r should increase sponsor surplus, and therefore
increase, at least initially, the flow of B messages
7 Model behavior must be robust to variations in d




Validation of the model
We validated the model by performing a series of simulations that tested for
behavioral anomalies, response to parameter changes and behavior under
extreme conditions. The model passed each of our tests, which we summarize
in Table 1. We also performed a units check.
For one of the runs, we assigned low initial values for stocks message
backlog M, valuable B messages in backlog VB, B messages in backlog B, and
communication funding S. The S-shaped trajectory for M in Figure 15(a) is
expected for our model, which is a variant of the limits-to-growth generic
structure (Figure 3). The run in Figure 15(a) also confirms that spam produc-
tion can increase—the Feared scenario in Figure 1.
Fig. 15. Growth run
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We used the same growth run to test the simulated response rate. Since the
message backlog formulation (Eq. 1) assumes perfect mixing, we can only
approximate the response rate as a ratio of all processed valuable B messages
(bp
v, Eq. 12) to all type-B messages processed and deleted (that is exit rate bo,
Eq. 9):
  







The simulated response rate (Figure 15(b)) declines as the flow of B messages
increases, which corresponds to the reference mode on Figure 2(a).
Policies
We start policy experiments from a steady state. Parameter values and steady-
state values for stocks are listed in the Appendix.
Better filter
Filtering has been the most widely deployed tool for screening the unwanted
commercial messages in e-mail. The research to improve the ability of filters
to correctly classify spam is ongoing (Goodman et al., 2007), which raises
the question: Do better filters affect the aggregate flow of spam? We model
an improvement in the filter technology by lowering the desirable aggregate
misspecification rate Φ* at time 30 from 0.1 to 0.05, which translates into
lower misspecification rates η1 and η2 (Eq. 21). The effect of a better filtering
effort can be traced in Figure 3.
The improved filter blocks more messages (Figure 16(a)). The blocking rate
equals the flow of incoming messages less the message addition rate, mb = a + b
− mi. The rise in the simulated blocking rate corresponds to the reference mode
in Figure 2(c). Note that because of the improvement delay λφ (Eq. 20),
the simulated trajectory shows a gradual increase, rather than the step-wise
increase of the reference mode.
An improved filter lowers the flow of non-valuable messages added to the
backlog. Therefore, the average fraction of valuable B messages in the backlog
increases (Figure 16(c)). Having more valuable type-B messages in the backlog
improves revenue and surplus for sponsors (Figures 3 and 16(e)). In turn,
greater surplus increases communication funding (Figure 3). Given a constant
price for a marketing message, greater communication funding results in a
greater flow of type-B messages (Figures 3 and 16(f )). The growth in the flow of
B messages leads to the increase in the flow of B messages that pass the filter
and are added to the backlog (Figure 16(b)). This implies that the reference
mode of Figure 2(b) does occur, but the decline in delivered electronic ads is
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Fig. 16. Improvement of the filter at time 30. Trajectories for the experiment are compared to the base run: (a) improved filter
blocks more messages; (b) improved filter briefly reduces the flow of marketing messages into an inbox; (c) fewer non-valuable
type-B messages pass the filter; (d) with improved filter, response rates increase; (e) sponsors receive better surplus; (f) surplus
leads to greater aggreate flow of spam
not likely to last long. Better filtering improves the response rate (Figure 16(d))
and triggers the reinforcing Spam Growth loop (Figure 3), which drives the
spam production to a higher level than before.
An intuitive explanation for this result can be given with the help of
Figure 3. An improvement of a filter, say, through better calibration and train-
ing, reduces filtering errors. Fewer errors means that the filter blocks messages
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Fig. 17. Introduction
of a surcharge at time
30. In each run, the
surcharge is a percent






surcharge leads to less
funding; (d) surcharge
lowers overload,
please see next page
for (c) and (d)
that are of no interest to recipients but allows valuable messages through.
In effect, a good filter does the work of targeting for spammers. Thinking in
terms of the causal loop diagram in Figure 3, improved targeting and filtering
both improve the fraction of valuable marketing messages in the backlog.
Therefore, both improved targeting and improved filtering are likely to lead to
increased revenue for spammers and an increase in the flow of marketing
messages.
Introduction of surcharge
To test the effect of a surcharge scheme on sponsored communication, we
conduct a series of simulations by adding a surcharge at time 30 to the base
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Fig. 17. (Continued)
price (Eq. 18). The surcharge is a percent of the base price. The introduction of
a surcharge is modeled with the step function.
Figure 3 (top left) shows the causal chain of the surcharge and Figure 17(a)
shows the corresponding drop in the production of type-B messages. The
surcharge lowers revenue for sponsors (Figure 3), surplus (Figure 17(b)) and
communication funding (Figure 17(c)). The resulting reduction in the message
backlog implies lower than before overload (Figures 3 and 17(d)). These
experiments suggest that a sufficiently high surcharge can lead to a market
failure, so that for-profit Broadcasters B stop sending messages. This is not a
desired outcome (Figure 1).
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Fig. 18. Introduction
of the attention bond
at time 30. Bond
values are percentages
of the marginal










please see next page
for (c) and (d).
Adoption of an attention bond mechanism
An attention bond mechanism is simulated by changing parameter ω (Eq. 16)
from zero to a positive value. We use the step function to simulate this change.
We run two simulations, assuming initially that the value of a bond is 1
percent of the sponsor’s marginal revenue r, and then setting the value of the
attention bond to 10 percent of r. When the value of a bond, ω, increases, it
immediately lowers sponsor surplus (Figure 3), communication funding and
marketing messages. The message backlog is reduced since fewer messages
arrive now than before. Figure 18 shows the corresponding trajectories. Excessively
high bond payments can leave sponsors with losses (Figure 18(a)), which may
lead to the elimination of communication funding (Figure 18(b)) and suspen-
sion of all type-B broadcasting (the case of a 10 percent bond on Figure 18(c)).
From a societal standpoint, eliminating all marketing communication is not a
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Fig. 18. (Continued)
desired outcome (Figure 1). Simulations (Figure 19) reproduce the reference
mode in Figure 2(d).
Conclusion
This paper presents a generic model of message-based communication, with
recipients that have a limited information-processing capacity. Profit-seeking
broadcasters and sponsors exploit the freely available but limited attention
endowment of recipients. We examine the likely effects of filtering, surcharges
and the introduction of an attention bond. We assume that every recipient has
access to filtering and that the surcharge and attention bond policies are
universal, i.e., for-profit broadcasters and sponsors cannot avoid them.
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Fig. 19. An attention
bond improves the
response rate
Our analysis reveals the following findings:
1. A commercial communication system that depends on the attention of
recipients (as, for example, spam) may be described by a causal structure
that is an extension of the limits-to-growth generic system archetype.
2. Filtering, while effective at blocking unwanted messages, may encourage
the production of commercial messages. In other words, the widespread
deployment of filters and their improvement can increase, rather than
decrease, the amount of spam transmitted on the Internet and other com-
munication platforms.
3. By increasing the cost of communication, surcharges and attention bonds
can depress and even completely eliminate commercial communication.
This finding implies that poorly designed market-based mechanisms may
lead to market failure, not a socially desirable outcome.
The above findings have significant implications for the management of
unwanted commercial messages at the organizational and global levels. First,
marketers, managers and policy makers must recognize the importance of
mitigating excessive external demands on the limited attention endowments
of employees and customers. E-mail has, within just a few years, advanced
from an arcane fringe technology to the dominant means of business com-
munication within developed economies. When technology changes quickly,
there is a risk that management may be slow to appreciate the unintended
negative externalities associated with its deployment. Second, management must
proceed cautiously in embracing solutions that have not been modeled within
a realistic dynamic framework that accounts for the feedback effects and incentives
of the various players, whose interactions determine likely outcomes.
A third observation, pertinent to the management of commercial messages,
is that the optimal solution to the communications-related attention overload
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may not be achievable by firms acting independently. E-mail filters, for exam-
ple, can mitigate the overload problem locally, within the boundaries of a
single firm and, if all other things are held constant, a firm may be made better
off by introducing improved filters. But, as finding 2 implies, if all firms do the
same, then the global result may be more spam than otherwise and more,
rather than less, spam for the (always imperfect) filters to deal with. Each firm’s
decision to deploy filters has an externality effect on other firms that use e-
mail. The ultimate solution to the overload problem may require a cooperative
policy introduced globally by e-mail users and the ISPs that offer e-mail services.
Our analysis may be extended in a number of ways. A future model could
examine non-universal policies. Such a model would capture situations when,
for example, imposing surcharges on U.S.-based spammers merely allows
foreign-based spammers to increase production. The current model assumes
that the attention allocated by recipients to communication is fixed; a future
model could relax this assumption. Future analysis may also investigate non-
linear surcharges and attention bonds.
References
Anderson SP, De Palma A. 2005. A theory of information overload. http://www.
cireq.umontreal.ca/activities/papiers/04-05anderson.pdf [16 September 2008].
Chittenden L, Rettie R. 2003. An evaluation of email marketing and factors affecting
response. Journal of Targeting, Measurement and Analysis for Marketing 11(3): 203–218.
Claburn T. 2008. The cybercrime economy. Information Week (9 April). http://www.
informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2008/04/the_cyber_crime.html;
jsessionid=50IYFHY1JU4QIQSNDLOSKH0CJUNN2JVN?print=true [27 May 2008].
Cormack GV. 2006. The trec 2005 spam filter evaluation track. Virus Bulletin January:
S2.
Dai R, Li K. 2004. Shall we stop all unsolicited email messages? In First Conference on
Email and Anti-Spam CEAS 2005, Mountain View, CA, 30–31 July 2004.
Davenport TH, Beck JC. 2001. The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Cur-
rency of Business. Harvard Business School Press: Boston, MA.
EmailLabs. 2006. Email marketing statistics and metrics. EmailLabs.com. http://
www.emaillabs.com/resources/resources_statistics.html [6 January 2007].
Fahlman S. 2002. Selling interrupt rights: a way to control unwanted e-mail and
telephone calls. IBM Systems Journal 41(4): 759–766.
Fallows D. 2003. Spam: how it is hurting email and degrading life on the Internet. PEW
Internet Project, Washington, DC.
Gatti J. 2004a. Digital secures significant spot in marketing mix. Direct Marketing
February: 1–2.
Gatti J. 2004b. Study: false positives to cost companies $419m by 2008. Direct Marketing
February: 1.
Gatti J. 2004c. Survey: spam thwarting online sales growth. Direct Marketing February: 1.
Goldman E. 2006. A Coasean analysis of marketing. Wisconsin Law Review 2006(4):
1151–1221.
404 System Dynamics Review Volume 24 Number 3 Fall 2008
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/sdr
Goodman J, Cormack GV, Heckerman D. 2007. Spam and the ongoing battle for the
inbox. Communications of the ACM 50(2): 25–33.
Greco GM, Floridi L. 2004. The tragedy of the digital commons. Ethics and Information
Technology 6(2): 73–81.
Hansell S. 2003. An unrepentant spammer vows to carry on, within the law. New York
Times Online 30 December.
Houston FS, Scott D. 1984. The determinants of advertising page exposure. Journal of
Advertising 13(2): 27–34.
Hunter D. 2003. Cyberspace as place and the tragedy of the digital anticommons.
California Law Review 91(2): 439–519.
Khong DWK. 2004. An economic analysis of spam law. Erasmus Law and Economics
Review 1 (February): 23–45.
Kleiner K. 2008. Happy spamiversary! Spam reaches 30. NewScientist.com (25 April).
http://technology.newscientist.com/article/dn13777-happy-spamiversary-spam-
reaches-30.html [27 May 2008].
Kraut RE, Sunder S, Morris J, Telang R, Filer D, Cronin M. 2002. Markets for attention:
will postage for e-mail help? Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-28.
Loder T, Van Alstyne M and Wash R. 2006. An economic response to unsolicited
communication. Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 6(1): 1–38.
Magill K. 2007. E-mail roi still a stunner, but diminishing: Dma. Direct Magazine (23
October). http://directmag.com/disciplines/email/email_roi_diminishing/ [May 27 2008].
Marshal. 2007. Marshal security threats: Spam, phishing, malware. http://www.marshal.com/
newsimages/trace/Marshal_Trace_Report-Dec_2007.pdf [25 May 2008].
Martin BA, Durme JV, Raulas M, Merisavo M. 2003. Email advertising: exploratory
insights from Finland. Journal of Advertising Research 43(3): 293–300.
McFadden D. 2001. The tragedy of the commons. Forbes ASAP 168: 61–62.
McWilliams B. 2005. Spam Kings. O’Reilly: Sebastopol, CA.
Pashler H. 1998. Attention. Psychology Press: Hove, UK.
Pavlov OV, Melville N, Plice R. 2005. Mitigating the tragedy of the digital commons: the
problem of unsolicited commercial e-mail. Communications of the Association for
Information Systems 16: 73–90.
Rainie L, Fallows D. 2004. The impact of can-spam legislation. Pew Internet Project:
Washington, DC.
Regan P. 2002. Privacy as common good in the digital world. Information, Communica-
tion and Society 5(3): 382–405.
Return Path. 2006. Bonded sender program white paper. http://www.returnpath.biz/
pdf/bondedsender.pdf [14 March 2006].
Rubenking NJ. 2004. Antispam tools keep up. PC Magazine 23(14): 30–33.
Rudolph HJ. 1947. Attention and Interest Factors in Advertising. Funk & Wagnalls: New York.
Rust RT, Espinoza F. 2006. How technology advances influence business research and
marketing strategy. Journal of Business Research 59: 1072–1078.
Scalet SD. 2003. The great spam supply chain. CIO Magazine (15 March). http://
www.cio.com/article/31787/The_Great_Spam_Supply_Chain [25 May 2008].
Senge PM. 1990. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organiza-
tion. Doubleday/Currency: New York.
Starch D. 1966. Measuring Advertising Readership and Results. McGraw-Hill: New York.
Stix G. 2002. Tragedy of the cyber commons. Scientific American 286(4): 36.
Sweet M. 2003. Political e-mail: protected speech or unwelcome spam? Duke Law
Oleg V. Pavlov et al.: Communication Model 405
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/sdr
and Technology Review (0001). http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/
2003dltr0001.html [25 May 2008].
The Economist. 2004. Make ’em pay: the fight against spam. 12 February: 74.
Turley SK. 1999. A case of response rate success. Journal of the Market Research
Society 41(3): 301–310.
Van Zandt T. 2004. Information overload in a network of targeted communication.
RAND Journal of Economics 35(3): 542–560.
Appendix
Table 2 summarizes parameter and stock values at steady state.
Value Units
Recipients sector
R Number of recipients 100 Recipient
TR Average time recipient spends on messages 20 Minute/(day * recipient)
γ Normal response delay 4 Days
τ Average time to process a message 1 Minute/message
d Average sensitivity to overload 3 Dimensionless
M Message backlog 8830 Messages
VB Valuable B messages in backlog 492 Messages
B B messages in backlog 6402 Messages
Sponsors sector
τS Budget duration 10 Days
ξ Fraction 0.1 Dimensionless
ω Value of a bond 0 $/message
r Marginal revenue 2000 $/message
S Communication funding 202796 $
Broadcasters A sector
aR Average flow of A messages 10 Messages/day/recipient
Broadcasters B sector
pB Base price 1 $/message
ρ Share of valuable B messages 0.01 Dimensionless
s Surcharge 0 $/message
IT company sector
λφ Improvement delay 10 Days
h1 Original η1 0.01 Dimensionless
h2 Original η2 0.12 Dimensionless
Φ* Desirable aggregate misspecification rate 0.1 Dimensionless
F Original aggregate misspecification rate 0.1 Dimensionless
Table 2. Steady-state
values and units
